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CADRE DE PRÉSERVATION DE LA CONFIDENTIALITÉ POUR UNE MAISON
INTELLIGENTE UTILISANT LE CRYPTAGE BASÉ SUR L’ATTRIBUT
Rasel CHOWDHURY
RÉSUMÉ
L’IoT est l’une des technologies émergentes qui ont déjà inﬂuencé sur notre vie quotidienne
de diverses manières. En raison de l’amélioration du mode de vie, les gens deviennent de plus
en plus dépendants des appareils et des environnements IoT comme les téléphones intelligents,
les appareils portables, la maison intelligente, etc. Les inﬂuences de l’IoT varient d’une sim-
ple machine à café préprogrammée, véhicules intelligents jusqu’à la vie assistée. Pour cela,
ces appareils communiquent entre eux pour fournir des services aux utilisateurs ainsi qu’aux
fournisseurs de services. Cependant, ces données communiquées provenant des appareils con-
tiennent beaucoup d’informations à caractère personnel (personal identity information (PII)).
La plupart du temps, les utilisateurs de ces appareils ne sont pas au courant de ces informations
ou bien n’ont pas le contrôle sur les données envoyées au cloud (nuage). Même le cloud sont
sécurisés mais ils sont toujours curieux. Par ailleurs, il existe peu de normes pour la sécurité
IoT, et en plus, la plupart de leurs mécanismes de sécurité pour IoT fournissent seulement une
connexion sécurisée de bout en bout comme TLS, DTLS, etc., alors que les données elles-
mêmes ne sont pas sécurisées. Selon les nouveaux règlements de sécurité comme GDPR et
FTC, les données doivent être cryptées à la source et le propriétaire de données a le droit des
données et doit fournir le consentement chaque fois qu’elles sont utilisées par les fournisseurs
de services. L’un des meilleurs moyens d’atteindre ces exigences est d’utiliser le cryptage basé
sur l’attribut (Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE)) qui fournit le contrôle d’accès ainsi que le
cryptage des données. Dans ce mémoire, nous proposons deux approches différentes pour la
sécurité, la conﬁdentialité et le contrôle d’accès aux données utilisateur en utilisant ABE et la
maison intelligente (smart home) comme étude de cas.
Mots-clés: IoT, Conﬁdentialité des données, Attribute-Based Encryption, Cryptographie ap-
pliquée, Externalisation de chiffrement, Contrôle d’accès, Maison intelligente.

PRIVACY-PRESERVING FRAMEWORK FOR SMART HOME USING ATTRIBUTE
BASED ENCRYPTION
Rasel CHOWDHURY
ABSTRACT
IoT is one of the emerging technologies that have already effected our daily life in various ways.
Due to the nature and ease of living, people are becoming more and more dependent on the
IoT devices and environments like smart phones, wearable devices, smart home and etc. IoT
has inﬂuences over a various domain from a simple pre-programmed coffee machine, smart-
vehicles to assisted living. These devices communicate with each other to provide services
to the users as well as the service providers. But these communicated data coming from the
devices contains a lot of information about personal identity information (PII). Most of the
time, the users of these devices are unaware of these information or they do not have the control
over the data that they are sending to the cloud. Even the cloud services are secured but they are
always curious. There are few standards for IoT security, still most of the security mechanisms
for IoT are only providing End-to-End secured connections like TLS, DTLS, etc. but the data
itself is not secured. According to the new security regulations like GDPR, FTC and etc. the
data has to be encrypted at the source and data owner have the right of the data and needs
to provide consent whenever used by the service providers. One of the best way to achieve
these requirements is to use Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) which provides access control
as well as data encryption. In this dissertation we are proposing two different approaches for
the security, privacy and access control of user data using ABE and smart home as the case
study.
Keywords: IoT, Data Privacy, Data Security, Attribute-Based Encryption, Applied cryptogra-
phy, Encryption Outsourcing, Access Control, Smart Home.
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INTRODUCTION
Security and Privacy of Internet of Things (IoT) has become an important issue. Since IoT is
becoming one of the most prominent trend in the current technological advancement, as the
world is becoming inter-connected with the internet. IoT has inﬂuenced all the technological
domains starting from a simple ﬁtness tracker to a fully automated autonomous car manu-
facturing industry. In this chapter we will show the background of IoT, Security and privacy
issues concerning IoT and its interleaved technologies, objective of the dissertation, and a brief
discussion on the proposed methodologies.
0.1 Internet of Things
According to (Roberto Minerva & Rotondi (2015)), IoT is a system of collaboration of compu-
tational elements controlling physical entities with respect to some events in the real world. In
different context IoT can be deﬁned as Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communications, where
different devices communicate with each other in order to fulﬁll a common goal together. With
the help of IoT, physical objects can be controlled or sensed remotely from anywhere using
the existing network infrastructures. The network infrastructure allows direct integration of
physical standalone things into computer based systems, which is improving efﬁciency, accu-
racy and also reducing human intervention. IoT can be traced back to simple Wireless Sensor
Network (WSN) and have evolved to become a sophisticated and complex mesh network of
devices, domains, and industries as shown in Figure 0.1.
Some of the examples of IoT are in health-care, smart-grid, self-driving cars and drones, video
surveillance system with tracking using image recognition, contactless and biometric systems
for payment, agriculture and mining, production and even in education and training (Ashton
(2016)). IoT has inﬂuenced in every aspects of personal life, ranging from automated coffee
2Figure 0.1 IoT Overview.
machine to a fully automated smart environment or cities. The trend IoT is following (Newman
(2017)), it will become more fragmented and distributed.
30.2 Security issues regarding IoT
Security and privacy always been a challenging aspect while dealing with technology and per-
sonal data. Due to the rapid technological advancement, the need for security and privacy has
increased drastically over the few years. According to the Annual Cybercrime Report (Morgan
(2018)) from Cybersecurity Ventures predicts that cybercrime will cost $6 trillion annually by
2021. Meanwhile, Ponemon Institute funded by IBM (Institute (2018)), conducted a study on
Data Breach that the global average cost of a data breach is $3.62 million. According to Gart-
ner (Gartner (2017b)), worldwide spending on information security products and services at
$86.4 billion in 2017, and they predicted that spending will increase to $93 billion in 2018.
Data Conﬁdentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) Triad (Figure 0.2c) is the basic model
for designing any technological security system. CIA Triad allows the security experts and
manufacturers to balance the different aspects aspects for the emerging technologies. As the
cyber threat vectors are becoming more complex day by day there is an addition of "resilience"
in the CIA triad. Resilience means failure of any discrete component should not cause systemic
failure. According to the new laws and regulations enforced by the government like FTC (FTC
(2016)), GDPR (GDPR (2016)), FISMA (FISMA (2016)) for personal data protection, as for
example, the guideline for protecting PII (Erika McCallister & Scarfone (2010)), the security
aspects while dealing with personal data has to changed. Figure 0.2a and Figure 0.2b shows
the security and privacy requirements for dealing with the personal data, for example, all data
should be kept encrypted, the communication has to be secured as well processing of data, the
data owner has the right to decide what part of the data can be accessed by the service provider
and what should be shared to the third party, etc. Also the regulations state that the service
providers have to protect personal data during their business period and then delete the data
after that as well as the service provider can not share those data with any third parties.
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Figure 0.2 Security Aspects.
The popularity of IoT is increasing mainly due to the drastical increase of popularity and crave
for smart devices, sensors, cheaper devices and the capabilities of cloud computing. IoT de-
vices fully depend on the computational power of the cloud and existing network infrastrucu-
tures to work together as one to serve a common purpose. The services provided by the Cloud
can easily satisfy the massive and changing demand on different resources constrained devices.
5It is providing all the necessary services like computation, analytics and storage for the IoT re-
source constrained devices (Avoyan (2017)). According to (McKendrick (2016)) by the end of
2020, 68% of the cloud workloads will be in public cloud data centers. So data privacy and
security in the third party cloud services brings new concerns, since the clouds might be honest
but as well as curious (Chai & Gong (2012)) by collecting information without notiﬁng the
data owner. There are several security issues (Brodkin (2008)) (Prinzlau (2017)) related to the
third party cloud service, for example, there are chances of for the loss of sensitive data and
data leakage which raises the risk of data misused by the service provider or attacker, cloud
credential and key management of cloud services might lead to potential breaches. Al Morsy
et al. (Almorsy et al. (2016)) showed some of the security issues relevant to virtualization,
multi-tenancy, management and hostile networks. Even though cloud services provides basic
security features and functionality to ensure the security of the whole database, but most of the
time the data itself is not secured, so there is always a single point of failure.
Figure 0.3 IoT prediction. (Ródenas (2015))
6According to (Gartner (2017a)), there are 8.4 billion connected things in 2017 and by the end
of 2021 there will 50 billion devices (Peter Middleton & Rueb (2017)) as shown in Figure
0.3. Most of the time IoT devices send data to the cloud which are usually small in size
but the amount of data being sent are usually periodical, which eventually leads to a huge
volume. From a survey conducted by Cisco (McKendrick (2016)) (Cisco (2017)) that IoT will
generate 600 Zetabyte of data by 2020 which is an 275% increase from 2016. Data coming
from the sensors and devices in domain of smart-home or healthcare and etc. contain Personal
Identiﬁcation Information (PII) or Sensitive Personal Information (SPI). PII (Wikipedia (2018))
is a term used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity and habit, such as name, social
identiﬁcation number, date and place of birth, when the person sleeps, daily routine and etc.
If these PII or SPI is either misused by service provider or any third party or even there is
a breach in the cloud where the data is being stored there will be serious consequences on
the security and privacy of the data owner. Access control of the data is the right of the data
owner, the owner should decide which data to be shared, what are not and to whom the data
will be shared. There are few methods of data access control like Role-Based Access Control
(Ferraiolo et al. (1995)) and Attribute-Based Access Control (Yuan & Tong (2005)) but they
are not computationally adequate to run on IoT devices and also these techniques will totally
block the data from sending to the cloud and sometime it is important to keep the history of the
data for the future in case of emergency or for archiving as all data are important.
In the context of security in IoT devices are the most challenging, since regular security mech-
anisms cannot be incorporated, as IoT devices does not have the adequate resources to perform
complicated encryption or to integrate security and privacy mechanisms, so in most of the
cases IoT devices are vulnerable for being exploits. Different types of experiments or exploits
were performed with the IoT environment using commercial of-the-shelf products. One of this
type of experiment (Schurgot et al. (2015)) is done using SMART Things which is a popular
middleware for smart home. In this experiment, there were mainly privacy attack on system
7and are performed using cryptographic technique and information manipulation. According to
a survey by eclipse (Skerrett (2017)), security is one of the key concern for IoT which includes
communication security, data encryption, PKI and etc. Also a report by AT&T (AT&T (2016))
showed that there is a 458% increase in vulnerabilities in IoT devices in the two years. Some of
worst IoT exploits are Mirai Botnet (Antonakakis et al. (2017)), hackable cardiac pacemakers
(Osborne (2017)), Owlet baby heart monitor vulnerabilities (Stanislav & Beardsley (2015)),
TRENDnet webcam hack (Zetter (2012)), smart home devices used as botnet (BBC (2017))
and etc. The vulnerabilities and exploits in IoT are happening are mainly due to the lack of
light weight security mechanisms which can be used in these resource constrained devices
(Maddox (2016)). In addition, most of the security mechanism deals with E2E secured con-
nection like TLS, DTLS, etc. but there are few security mechanism that deals with the data
security, integrity and access control. All the current technologies in the IoT domain provides
End-to-End (E2E) security but lacks adequate security mechanisms incorporated with them
especially data privacy, data encryption and access control (Barnes (2017)).
0.3 Objective
In this project, we are mainly focusing on one of the security aspect of IoT regarding the data
privacy and integrity at the source using Smart Home as our case study. Smart home (Figure
0.4) is one of the IoT applications that is leveraging the Cloud adequately. Since most of the
sensors and devices do not have enough computational power and are resource constrained,
so outsourcing the data to the cloud is one of the best solution for data storage, analytics and
computation. Additionally, connecting the smart home to the cloud allows analytics which
tempts many services like healthcare, surveillance, assisted living, smart grid and etc.
Security and privacy has become an important issue in a smart home environment, since sensors
and smart devices are pervasively sends data to the cloud which can lead to information that
can reveal a person’s daily routine (Wilbanks (2007)). As discussed before, outsourcing sensed
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data from smart home to the cloud will cause serious privacy concerns. One privacy preserving
approach addressing this speciﬁc problem consists to encrypt data, before its sent to the cloud,
according to smart home owner preferences. The main objective of this research is to add or
incorporate a suitable security integration methods for privacy preserving mechanism in an IoT
environment speciﬁcally Smart Home.
0.4 Methodology
In order to provide security and privacy, we are proposing a cryptographic encryption approach
where users’ can access data which is granted by the home owner only. For this purpose, we
are proposing two architectures integrating Attribute-Based encryption (ABE) (Goyal et al.
(2006)) schemes in the Smart Home Middleware. ABE is an asymmetric encryption scheme
where data is encrypted and decrypted using some attributes like user id, service provider,
9sensor category, etc. The data owner has the overall access control of the data by speci-
fying an access policy over ﬁnite number attributes. Only authorized users owning the re-
quired attributes are required to satisfy the policy can decrypt the ciphertext. There are mainly
two schemes belonging to ABE class are: Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE)
(Goyal et al. (2006)) and Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) (Bethen-
court et al. (2007)). The main advantage of ABE is the possibility of specifying ﬂexible ﬁne-
grained access control policies over encrypted data, which is an important requirement for the
privacy of the data. In addition, this encryption system does not put any restriction on neither
the number of authorized entities nor their identities. This feature enables a reliable anony-
mous access control. Our proposition is providing architectures and techniques to provide data
security, integrity and access control from the source even in the cloud, so if the cloud or data
is compromised the attacker will not have access to the plaintext data.
We incorporated ABE mechanism into an well-known IoT middleware ’openHAB’ (openHAB
(2018)) (Chapter 3) as a plugin for portability. In order to show that the security architecture is
feasible, we did simulation of a smart home with multiple sensors, users and service provider.
Finally we evaluated different ABE schemes to see the performance of the architecture based
on resource consumption, latency, frequency of data and the number of sensors with the mid-
dleware.
Then we extended the architecture by ofﬂoading the ABE encryption to a proxy server (Chapter
4), to reduce the overhead in the smart home gateway. The main idea of this implementation
is to do partial encryption at the smart home gateway and rest of the encryption is passed to a
proxy server in order to reduce the computational overheads on the resource constrained device.
In this architecture we also designed a data collector which acts as a middleware to reduce extra
computational overhead of openHAB. Finally we evaluated different ABE schemes using the
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ofﬂoading technique to see the performance of the architecture based on resource consumption,
latency and interval of data.
0.5 Contributions
The purpose of this research is to provide a mechanism for data privacy in an IoT middleware.
The research is mainly divided in two parts, ﬁrstly privacy mechanism using an open-source
IoT middleware and later an optimization of the ABE scheme using ofﬂoading technique. The
outline of the contributions of our research are as follows:
- An integration mechanism for privacy preserving technique using ABE with a well known
IoT middleware ’openHAB’;
- Simulating a smart home to show that the mechanism is feasible for a smart environment;
- Experimentation with various ABE techniques to provide a comparison of different ABE
schemes with respect to resource consumptions and latencies.
- Extending the privacy preserving technique by encryption ofﬂoading using dummy attribute
concept;
- Implementation of a simple data collector which serves as middleware to see the perfor-
mance of the scheme;
- Experimentation with various ABE techniques using the concept of dummy attribute for
ofﬂoading encryption on different ABE schemes with respect to resource consumptions
and latencies.
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0.6 Summary
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows, Chapter 1 presents the backgrounds of mid-
dlewares and cryptographic preliminaries and schemes, Chapter 2 reviews the related works,
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 present the architectures, implementations and experimentations,
Chapter 5 presents the future work, and we summarize the dissertation in the Conclusion.

CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND
The purpose of the background study presented, is to provide information regarding the encryp-
tion preliminaries and schemes that is being used in this dissertation as well as the backgrounds
of IoT middlewares. The chapter begins with the IoT middlewares, middleware requirements,
types of middlewares and some examples of IoT middlewares speciﬁcally designed for smart
home. Then we showed the comparison of different middleware using some predeﬁned crite-
ria. Then we moved to the basic idea of pairing based cryptography, ABE schemes, types, and
algorithms.
1.1 IoT Middleware
Middleware or Smart Gateway plays an vital role in the IoT infrastructure. Middleware is a
collaboration of hardware and software which is responsible for receiving or sending the data
from and to the sensors on behalf of the users. It serves as an intermediary for the embedded
systems and the application to communicate with each other. They also provide a platform for
the users or services to communicate with the sensors and actuators. Some of the middleware
requirements for IoT are functional, non-functional and architectural (Razzaque et al. (2016))
(Stankovic (2014)).
- Functional requirements
• Resource discovery: The middleware must have mechanisms to detect the presence of
devices or sensors and should be able to dynamically connect to them.
• Resource management: A middleware needs the manage the services provided by the
sensors or devices and should be able to monitor them.
• Data management: A middleware needs to have the capabilities to manage data that is
sent to it from the sensors or devices for processing, ﬁltering and storage.
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• Event management: A middleware should be able to handle huge number of events
that is being sent from sensors or devices without creating congestion or degrading the
performance of the system.
• Code management: A middleware must be able to deploy codes that is upgrade version
of the application without being interrupted from its regular services.
- Non-functional requirements
• Scalability: A middleware needs to have be scalable to the growth of the devices or
sensors so that it can accommodate the applications and network.
• Real time: The middleware should provide services in real-time and on time when an
event is occurred.
• Reliability: The middleware should be reliable and work smoothly during the lifetime
of the system even if there is a failure.
• Availability: The middleware has to available or appear to be online especially in mis-
sion critical situation like in healthcare. The middleware should be prune to fault toler-
ance.
• Security and privacy: The middleware must have security mechanism so that there no
malicious attacker can have access into the middleware is not information leakage.
• Ease-of-deployment: The middleware needs to have the portability that is easily de-
ployed with less or no knowledge of the system.
• Popularity: The middleware should provide service and support throughout the life
time of the system.
- Architectural requirement
• Programming abstraction: The middleware needs to provide API for developers for
faster development of application.
• Interoperable: The middleware has to work with heterogeneous devices, technologies
or application without additional effort.
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• Service-based: The middleware should be service-based to offer high ﬂexibility when
a function needs to be added or deleted.
• Adaptive: The middleware needs to adaptive so that it can evolve to ﬁt itself into
changes in its environment.
• Context-aware: The middleware should be aware of the users, devices or environments
context and use these for effective and essential services offering to users.
• Autonomous: The middleware must be able to communicate with each other without
human intervention.
• Distributed: The middleware has to be sufﬁcient to support many distributed services
and application.
1.1.1 Different kinds Middleware
There are different types of middlewares, and they are categorised as follows (Razzaque et al.
(2016))
- Event-based middleware: This type of middleware uses change in state for interaction,
that is publish/subscribe between the embedded systems to the cloud.
- Service-oriented middleware: This kind of middleware uses service based subscription
for transfer of data from the cloud to the embedded system.
- VM-based middleware: VM-based middleware uses virtualizations of embedded systems
in the cloud. Each embedded system has its own image in the middleware and the users
communicate with the image for getting the data from the sensors.
- Agent-based middleware: These middleware view the embedded systems as agents.
- Tuple-space middleware: This type of middleware each sensors and embedded systems
are viewed as tuples of a whole system.
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- Database-oriented middleware: These views the whole system of embedded systems and
sensors as a part of a database, each components acts a record of the database.
- Application-speciﬁc middleware: This middleware is based on speciﬁc applications of a
domain.
1.1.2 Examples of Middlewares
There are lot of middlewares emerging due to necessity and demands of Do-It-Yourself (DIY)
projects. Some of the middleware are open-source and some are paid services. Among the
open-source middlewares some of the well-known are as follows:
1.1.2.1 openHAB
Figure 1.1 Architecture of openHAB ) (openHAB (2018))
openHAB (openHAB (2018)) is a software for implementing different home automation sys-
tems and technologies into one single platform like SmartThings, Logitech, Harmony Hub,
Helios, etc. openHAB is an event-based middleware where the user subscribes to devices no-
tiﬁcation to get access to the device. openHAB runtime is implemented using Java and is
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mainly based on Eclipse SmartHome framework with Apache and Eclipse Equinox for the
Open Service Gateway initiative (OSGi) runtime environment. There are two different internal
communication one is The Event bus and Item repository. The architecture of the openHAB
middleware is shown in Figure 1.1. This middleware doesn’t support any security mechanism
for secured communication and there is no privacy policies to govern the access to the devices
in the smart home.
1.1.2.2 Mbed
Figure 1.2 Architecture of Mbed (Mbed (2018))
Mbed (Mbed (2018)) is one of latest IoT architecture platform developed by ARM. This plat-
form is specially designed for ARM based microcontrollers and designed for all open stan-
dards for connectivity and device management. As shown in Figure 1.2 the architecture is
divided into two parts, Mbed OS and the Mbed Cloud. The platform has the ability for device
management, device identity as well as integrated security measurement like TLS for secured
connection.
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1.1.2.3 HomeGenie
HomeGenie (HomeGenie (2018)) (Figure 1.3) is an open source event-based middleware de-
signed on a multi-standard basis. HomeGenie can be interfaced with various devices running
on protocols such as Z-Wave, Philips Hue, UPnP / DLNA etc. to communicate with external
web services and integrate all of this into a common automation environment.
Figure 1.3 Architecture of HomeGenie (HomeGenie (2018))
1.1.2.4 Home Assistant
Home Assistant (Assistant (2018)) (1.4) is open source middleware for home automation.
Home Assistant is a message-oriented agent-based middleware were each device act as a com-
ponent which are added easily and the middleware listen for different type of notiﬁcations
which is either a trigger or a stream of message. Home Assistant can be extended by compo-
nents. Each component is responsible for a speciﬁc domain within Home Assistant. Compo-
nent listens for or triggers a speciﬁc events, offer services and maintain states. Home Assistant
also allows automation of devices.
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Figure 1.4 Architecture of Home Assistant (Assistant (2018))
1.1.2.5 openRemote
OpenRemote (OpenRemote (2018)) is an open source middleware for home and commer-
cial building automation. Its architecture allows autonomous and user-independent intelligent
buildings, some of the products uses openRemote are Philips, ooma, neeo and etc.
Figure 1.5 Architecture of openRemote (OpenRemote
(2018))
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1.1.3 Middleware comparison
The comparison of off-the-shelf middlewares are summarized in Table 1.1 based on some spe-
ciﬁc criteria like supported OS, hardware and security mechanisms available in them. As
shown in the table, all the middlewares support most of the communication protocols like
MQTT, BLE, Zigbee and etc. The middlewares under survey supports all the Operating sys-
tems available except for the Mbed which has its own architecture and OS requirements. From
the table we can see that most of the middleware does support E2E secured connections like
SSL, TLS and DTLS but none of them have built-in mechanism for data encryption, data in-
tegrity and access control for the privacy of the data. Mbed supports security but the security
implementation are limited to speciﬁc cryptographic algorithms and certiﬁcates.
Table 1.1 Comparison of middlewares.
Middleware Type Supported Embedded Supported Security and
OS hardware Protocol Privacy
openHAB Open Windows, Raspberry Pi, KNX, Z-Wave, SSL
Source Linux, Beagle Bone ZigBee,MQTT, No privacy module
MacOS, etc Bluetooth, Basic authentication
Raspbian UPnP
HomeGenie Open Windows, Not X10, Z-Wave, SSL
Source Linux, Applicable ZigBee No privacy module
MacOS, UPnP Basic authentication
Home Open Windows, Raspberry Pi Z-Wave,IFTTT SSL
Assistant Source Linux, ZigBee,MQTT, No privacy module
MacOS, Bluetooth, Basic authentication
Raspbian etc
OpenRemote Open Windows, Not KNX, Z-Wave, SSL
Source & Linux, Applicable ZigBee,MQTT, No privacy module
Paid MacOS, etc Basic authentication
Service
The Thing Open Raspbian, Raspberry Pi, RFID, Z-Wave, TSL
System Source Linux, Beagle Bone ZigBee,MQTT, No privacy module
MacOS, etc. UPnP, Basic authentication
etc
Mbed Open mbed os ARM cortex, BLE, Z-Wave, SSL/TLS
Source Mbed Boards ZigBee,MQTT, Crypto libraries
etc Bluetooth, X.509 certiﬁcates
LoWPAN, etc
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1.2 Cryptographic premitives
1.2.1 Pairing-based Cryptography
Pairing-based Cryptography (PBC) is a form of cryptography where a pairing of vectors is used
to generate the cryptographic parameters. In order to satisfy the PBC requirements, the pairing
group has to satisfy, bilinearity, non-degeneracy and computability. A pairing is a bilinear map
function where elements of two vector spaces are combined to form a third element, e.g. G1 x
G2 → GT .
1.2.2 Elliptical Curve Cryptography
Elliptical Curve Cryptography (ECC) is an asymmetric key cryptography based on the elliptic
curves structure over a ﬁnite ﬁeld. Elliptical curve is a curve deﬁned as y2 = x3 + ax + b (Wol-
framMathWorld (2018)). ECC generates keys based on the elliptical curve equations instead
of using large prime numbers which is the traditional method of generating the keys for the
cryptographic operations. ECC key generation is faster, smaller in size and are more efﬁcient
than PKI cryptographic keys. ECC have the advantage of using smaller key to provide the
same level of security compared with non-ECC cryptography.
1.2.3 Access tree
Access tree is the representation of the access policy used in ABE into a tree form structure
where attributes of the policy is presented as the leave nodes and the operators are assigned as
the non-leaf nodes. For example, if we have a policy like "Hospital A AND Doctor = Bruce
OR Hospital B OR Type = cardiac AND Patient = Natasha" as an access control parameter for
a patient’s report then the Access tree structure is similar to the structure shown in Figure 1.6.
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Figure 1.6 Access Tree
1.2.4 Security level
Security level is the measurement for cryptographic algorithms which is related to the key size
or key length expressed in bits. Table 1.2 shows the comparison of security level for RSA and
ECC (Maletsky (2015)). From the Table 1.2 it is clear that ECC is much stronger than RSA.
For example, if we use 1024 bit security of RSA for the key generation, we can achieve the
same level of security using only 160 bit of ECC keys, which allows ECC to have same level
of security with lower key size compared with RSA.
Table 1.2 Comparison of Key size.
Symmetric Key Size RSA and Difﬁe-Hellman Key Size Elliptic Curve Key Size
(bits) (bits) (bits)
80 1024 160
112 2048 224
128 3072 256
192 7680 384
256 15360 512
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1.2.5 Attribute Based Encryption
ABE is an asymmetric encryption in which the Secret Key (SK) of the user and Ciphertext (CT)
are dependent on a range of attributes (e.g. department, postal code, designation and etc.). ABE
was ﬁrst proposed as an application of fuzzy identity-based encryption where data is encrypted
using individual identity deﬁned by a set of attribute (Sahai & Waters (2005)). Later (Goyal
et al. (2006)) explained the application in details using the term Attribute Based Encryption
where data is encrypted using some logical expression of attributes, known as access policy
such that encrypted data can be decrypted if that policy is satisﬁed also the scheme is collusion-
resistance.
ABE is one of the encryption schemes that allows ﬁne grained access control, which other
symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes do not offer. For example, as shown in Figure
1.7a, if we consider a scenario, where Scarlet and Bob shares a smart house which has multiple
sensors for energy and health care. Scarlet lives in ﬁrst ﬂoor of the house and Bob in second
ﬂoor and they have given access of the sensors to different Service Providers (SP) as shown in
Table 1.7b. For example, SP1 (Service Provider 1) requires all data of Scarlet, in traditional
symmetric encryption the data has to be encrypted with different keys for each sensors (s1, s3,
s5) where as in ABE scheme the encryption will be done using a policy (s1 OR s3 OR s5)
and only one key is required. SP2 requires all energy data of the house, so the encryption will
again require multiple keys for encryption where as ABE will require only one key. When we
have a complex case like in SP3 and SP4, Scarlet and Bob has to send speciﬁc keys which
satisﬁes the sharing of the data, meanwhile in ABE all they have to do is generate a key using
a simple policy that satisﬁes the access. So using ABE in a scenario where access control of
the personal data is the most suitable solution.
According to (Goyal et al. (2006)), the authors discussed that are mainly two forms of ABE:
Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE) and Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE).
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SP3: 2nd ﬂoor humidity from 2014 s4 (all keys from 2014) s4 AND time= >2014
SP4: Scarlet Morning Healthcare activity s7,s9 (speciﬁc keys) time= 6am<12pm AND s7 OR s9
b) Comparison of encryption technique
Figure 1.7 ABE representation
1.2.5.1 CP-ABE
CP-ABE is a form of ABE; where the data owner encrypts the data with a access policy,
whereas the secret key contains the attributes. The client who intends to decrypt this data must
have a secret key that satisfy the policy in CT. Figure 1.8 show visual representation of CP-
ABE. CP-ABE has four steps to perform encryption and decryption are as the follows and the
details of the algorithms are available in Appendix I.
Setup → (PK, MSK): Setup algorithm takes security parameters to generate Public Key (PK)
and Master Secret Key (MSK). PK available for any user and used as input for encryption
algorithm. MSK used to generate Secret Key (SK) in key Generation algorithm.
KeyGeneration (PK, MSK, ω)→ SK: KeyGeneration take the PK, MSK, and ω as input. ω
is list of attribute of the user. The output of this algorithm is the secret key SK.
Encryption (PK, M, α)→ CT: This algorithm the user encrypts his/her data with α where α
is the access policy. The output of this algorithm is the CT.
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Figure 1.8 CP-ABE
Decryption (CT, SK)→ M: In this algorithm the client uses her secret key to recover the
message.
1.2.5.2 KP-ABE
KP-ABE is the second form of ABE; the user encrypts the data with a list of attributes and
the secret key incorporates the access policy of the data. The secret key associated with the
access policy thus the trust authority who generate the SK will decide who encrypt the data.
Figure 1.9 show visual representation of KP-ABE. The following steps explain the main four
algorithms of KP-ABE and the details of the algorithms are available in Appendix I.
Setup → (PK, MSK): Setup algorithm used security parameters to generate PK and SK.
KeyGeneration (PK, MSK, α)→ SK: KeyGeneration algorithm used to generate SK. The
input of this algorithm PK, MSK, and the α . The algorithm generate SK.
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Encryption (PK, M, ω)→ CT: With this algorithm the user encrypts the data using ω to
generate CT.
Decryption (CT, SK)→M: This algorithm allows the client to use his/her SK to decrypt CT. If
the attributes that the CT associated with satisfy the policy that the SK associated with then the
client can decrypt CT and recover the message, otherwise to client will not be able to recover
the message.
1.3 Summary
In this chapter, we have shown the basic cryptographic prerequisites for ABE, types of ABE,
different algorithms for the ABE schemes. Then we have provided in detailed study of dif-
ferent IoT middlewares, different requirements and presented some examples of open-source
middlewares. At the end of the chapter we have shown a comparative study of middlewares
based on speciﬁc criteria.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are lot of researches done in the ﬁeld of IoT and smart home security and privacy. In
this chapter we will mainly focus on the security and privacy aspects of IoT and as well as the
recent advancement of ABE techniques. We conclude the chapter with the summary of ABE
techniques available.
2.1 IoT Security and Privacy
(Singh et al. (2016)) analysed twenty security considerations for IoT like secured communica-
tions (data leakage and integrity), access control for the IoT cloud (authentication and autho-
rization), identifying sensitive data (PII), encryption at the source and etc. from the perspective
of cloud, end-users and the cloud providers. The authors classiﬁed the issues as data in trans-
port, identity management, scale of IoT, rise of malicious things, trust, compliance with the
regulations and decentralization of IoT and cloud.
(Razzaque et al. (2016)) outlined different types of requirements and performed a intensive
review of existing middlewares. The authors explained the characteristics of the IoT infras-
tructure and IoT applications as well as the IoT middlewares requirements like functional,
non-functional, architectural and etc. using sixty one well known IoT middlewares. In this ar-
ticle the authors also explained challenges related to the requirements like resource discovery,
reliability, security and privacy.
(Henze et al. (2014)) designed a trust point-based security architecture for the sensors’ data in
the cloud which ties the data to the data owners using trust point, which servers as a trusted
node between the cloud and the sensors, the trust point has the features to preprocess the data
for the cloud and then forwards the data to the cloud for distribution. Also the trust point
is responsible for sharing the data key to the data owner. The architecture provides secured
E2E communication channel as well as it allows ﬁne grained access control along with key
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management. Later they extended the trust point concept using a user-driven enforcement of
ﬁne grained policy for the cloud based IoT services (Henze et al. (2016)).
(Malina et al. (2016)) presented a detailed experimental assessment for the performance of
the popular cryptographic algorithms like AES, RND, SHA and RSA on different resource
constrained IoT devices like MSP430F149, MSP430F6638, NXP JC3A09002, Nexus 5 and
etc. Their experimentation is based on the execution time of the cryptographic algorithm
using a constant size message. They have also analysed privacy preserving techniques like
k-anonymity, homomorphic encryption, group signatures and etc.
(Punia et al. (2017)) provided a summary of the security techniques available in IoT. The
article illustrated that a number of researches that is suitable for the IoT case study related
to conﬁdentiality, access control, privacy, security protocols and secure routings techniques.
The authors also illustrated some of the open issues regarding the physical security of the IoT
devices, big data security, application security and nature of IoT heterogeneous networks.
(Fernandes et al. (2017)) performed security analysis on one of the most popular IoT frame-
work, SmartThings which is mainly used in smart home environment. They analysed Smart-
Things products which includes SmartThings app (SmartApp), SmartThings HUB and differ-
ent smart home devices. They have discovered that 55% of the SmartApp does not provide
adequate access control, it has limited security mechanisms and also most of the application
does not use all the rights assigned to the devices’ operations. From these ﬁndings the authors
exploited the vulnerabilities and they were able to steal pin codes of the smart lock, access data
from the devices, enabling fake ﬁre alarms and etc.
(Jung et al. (2011)) implemented a privacy based access control using extensible access control
markup language (XACML) and security assertion markup language (SAML). They have used
privacy preserving API authorization mechanism, access is given on token based system which
is build using SAML and XACML. The architecture has Access token provider which offers
a web based user interface to specify and access policy for an application, Access token is
provided as SAML assertion containing attributes to the SAML proﬁle of XACML identifying
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the enabled soap operation, Access token injector adds the access token to each service request
and Access control component acts as a SOAP intermediary and process all SOAP requests
to the gateway. This architecture ensures trust using third party policies and data integrity is
also ensured. The main disadvantage of this architecture is the packet size of each message is
increased from 750 Byte to 14 Kilobyte which increases extra processing for the middleware.
(Marin et al. (2007)) proposed a middleware architecture for the smart home using authenti-
cation and access control by using credential manager, authentication and trust manager. This
middleware is a service-oriented middleware, which provides services and secure access to
the devices to the user and applications’ data. The middleware uses ACL (Access Control
List). This middleware also manages private and context information for ﬂexible device ac-
cess and control. In this middleware the user request the devices for speciﬁc services, then the
“Service” contact the “Trust Manager” to check for authorization. Trust Manager guarantees
security though the system and gives access right to the users’ desired service and also distin-
guish between users. Trust manager, credential manager and authentication manager uses DSA
signature scheme to prevent forgery or tampering. Credential Manager retrieves credentials in
form of access control list from the database and gives authorization. Whereas, (Moncrieff
et al. (2007)) proposed a dynamic adjustable privacy policies framework for smart home based
on spatial context, social context, hazard context and activity context. The system uses rule
based model and data ﬁltering to ensure the privacy of the user.
2.2 Attribute-Based Encryption
Attribute-Based Encryption is one the best way to achieve security and privacy as well access
control using one key for encryption as well as decryption for multiple data based on the access
policy of incorporated in the cipher text or the secret key itself. Most of the ABE schemes are
usually infeasible for the resource constrained IoT devices mainly due to the execution time
and as well as resource consumption for encryption and most of them are not designed for these
ubiquitous resource constrained devices. There are different approaches to make ABE schemes
lightweight computation for IoT resource constrained devices by performing pre-computation,
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removing bilinear pairing which reduces computation but the security level decreases, and etc.
In the dissertation, we classify the researches mainly into three categories, ﬁrstly feasibility of
ABE in resource constrained devices, secondly light-weight ABE encryption for IoT devices
and in the last category ofﬂoading the encryption to a resourceful devices which performs
partial encryption or decryption at the devices and ofﬂoad the rest of the operations to the
cloud.
2.2.1 Attribute-Based Encryption on resource constrained devices
(Ambrosin et al. (2016)) experimented on the feasibility of ABE in IoT devices like Intel
Galileo, Intel Edison and Raspberry Pi. The experimentation includes execution time, mem-
ory utilization and power consumption of CP-ABE scheme for encryption and decryption in
different hardwares varying the number of attributes and security level. In the experimentation
they have used maximum of 30 attributes and the message size of 3 bytes. Later they used a
health-care use case to show the latency of the system for the ABE. (Wang et al. (2014)) per-
formed intensive experimentation using ABE schemes on Android smart phone and PC. They
evaluated the performance of KP-ABE and CP-ABE schemes using 30 attributes at maximum
to ﬁnd the execution time for the encryption, decryption and key generation based on the secu-
rity level of ECC curves like 80 bit,112 bit and 128 bit. They also showed the results based on
the ECC security level for the ABE and RSA security level.
(Borgh et al. (2017)) showed two ways to use ABE in Information-Centric Network (ICN)
for the IoT resource constrained sensors. In their ﬁrst approach, the sensors encrypt the data
with symmetric encryption and the keys are shared with the trust authority and then the trust
authority encrypts the sensor keys with CP-ABE. The main issue with this approach is that
the communication channel needs to be trusted and the management of multiple keys but the
advantage of this approach is this requires less overheads on the sensors in terms of computa-
tion and resources. On the other approach the sensors encrypts the data with CP-ABE using
the PK, which is generated by the trust authority. The main disadvantage of the approach is
that it requires more computation as well as execution time and the advantage is that the com-
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munication channel does not required to be trusted and also it requires less number of keys
for decryption multiple sensor data. They have also performed experimentation based on the
number of attributes with respect to the execution time and RAM utilization of the sensors. In
their discuss they mentioned that the frequency of the data generated will have an affect the
computation.
2.2.2 Light-weight Attribute-Based Encryption for resource constrained devices
(Yao et al. (2015)) proposed a lightweight KP-ABE scheme for resource constrained IoT de-
vices by using non-pairing ECC. Their security implementation is based on ECDDH (Elliptic
Curve Decisional Difﬁe-Hellman) for complexity assumption and ECIES (Elliptic Curve In-
tegrated Encryption Scheme) for encryption instead of bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman based assump-
tion. In their scheme, they did computation during the "setup" algorithm to calculate the param-
eters with the attributes which saves the time during the encryption process. The main draw-
backs of this scheme are poor ﬂexibility regarding revoking or adding attributes, lower scala-
bility and the scheme can not be generalized for any scenario. Whereas, (Oualha & Nguyen
(2016)) proposed a ABE scheme by using pre-computation for the CP-ABE, during the pre-
computation the scheme stores the expensive ECC settings and the values of the pairs are
stored. This technique allows the encryption algorithm to compute the shares faster and even-
tually the execution of encryption process is reduced. The drawback of this scheme similar to
the (Yao et al. (2015)).
2.2.3 Outsourcing Attribute-Based Encryption
(Green et al. (2011)) are the ﬁrst researchers to propose an outsourcing technique for ABE.
Their scheme provides an efﬁcient and securely decryption of ABE ciphertext. The main
change in their scheme is for outsourcing the decryption, which is done using a enhanced
version of the "KeyGeneration" algorithm of ABE. There are two keys in this scheme, the ﬁrst
one is a small unique key which is kept by the user (SK), and the second one is a transforma-
tion key (TK) which is shared with the cloud as a PK. The TK partially decrypts the CT in
32
the cloud into a short CT and the user’s SK can only decrypt the CT fully. Still, the scheme
will cause computational overheads on the encryptor’s side and also the decryption will cause
overheads as well when there are lot of users. (Qin et al. (2015)) proposed an ABE scheme
which extends the (Green et al. (2011)) implementation by using veriﬁable outsourced decryp-
tion. Their implementation does not increase the computational cost on the users’ or clouds
sides. Their approach uses a hash function to reduce the size of the message and then there
are two symmetric encryptions which provides conﬁdentiality as well as ﬁne grained access
control over the data. Also (Lai et al. (2013)) extended the implementation of (Green et al.
(2011)) to provide a solution which allows the users to know if the transformation of the key
is done correctly. Whereas, (Balamurugan et al. (2013)) focused on the access key structure to
improve the security and performance by applying access rights for the authorized users.
(Touati et al. (2014)) proposed a C-CP-ABE (Cooperative ciphertext policy attribute-based)
where they focused mainly on the encryption algorithm and showed a technique for delegating
computational ofﬂoading to reduce overhead on resource constrained devices. The main idea
of their approach is to delegate the computation of the encryption to the neighbouring uncon-
strained devices as well as the remote servers. (Ishiguro et al. (2013)) proposed key-revocable
ABE scheme for the mobile cloud computing. Their research was to reduce the computational
overhead cost on the smart devices as well as user revocation and attribute hiding from the
cloud server. In order to reduce the computational overhead at the smart devices, they are
performing some encryption at the device level and the rest on the server side, so they ended
up with nine algorithm (Setup, KeyGeneration, EncyptUsr, EncryptSrv, GetCoupon, GetToken,
GetMaskKey, Decrypt_Srv, DecryptUsr) for their scheme. The advantage of this scheme that it
provides attribute hiding, user can not transfer or copy keys but the main disadvantage of this
scheme is the latency, computational cost for decryption and also the feasibility for implemen-
tation.
(Zhou & Huang (2012)) proposed a PP-CP-ABE (Privacy Preserving Constant CP-ABE) where
the encryption and decryption operations are outsourced to the cloud. According to their ﬁnd-
ing, the computation of ABE is dependent on the access tree structure and most of the com-
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putation for processing the left sub-tree is always higher than that of the right sub-tree. Their
implementation uses a speciﬁc structure for the access tree so that the left sub-tree has more at-
tributes than the right sub-tree. So they processed the right sub-tree in the resource constrained
device and the left sub-tree on a cloud platform. This allows reduced computational process-
ing in the resource constrained devices and more loads to the resourceful devices. Still, the
main drawback of this scheme is it not always feasible to generate the trees according to the
speciﬁc structure and also this scheme is restricted on the ﬂexibility of designing the tree struc-
ture. Later, (Jin et al. (2015)) enhanced the idea proposed by (Zhou & Huang (2012)) using a
dummy attribute. The scheme automatically adds a dummy attribute to the actual attribute list,
so the access tree becomes T = Tact
∧
Tdum where Tact is the access tree with actual attributes
and Tdum is the dummy attribute. This technique allows the access tree to have more attributes
on the left sub-tree than the right sub-tree. Therefore, during encryption the device just only
computes the data using the Tdum and the Tact is computed in the cloud.
Table 2.1 shows the summary of the ABE schemes based on the constructions, where we
showed the different schemes of ABE, type of the scheme, whether the implementation is
suitable for resource constrained devices and as well as the scheme is suitable for outsourcing
the encryption process.
2.3 Summary
In this chapter we have discussed the different researches doing on in the ﬁeld of IoT security
and privacy. From the related works, it is clear that most of the research are done mainly for the
privacy of the IoT domains where they are enforcing different access control mechanism like
trust point architecture, XACML or SAML and as well as E2E communication techniques like
DTLS. Some of the related works discuss the encryption overheads of resource constrained
devices. Whereas, others researched on different ABE schemes and techniques which are
applied on resource constrained devices, which can be used for data encryption along with
access control. Most of the ABE schemes available shows the feasibility of the schemes with
respect to resource constrained devices. But few works and research were implemented with a
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Table 2.1 Comparison of different schemes based on the construction.
Scheme CP-ABE KP-ABE ECC Bilinear Constrained Outsource
Pairing Device
Bethencourt et al. (2007)      
Goyal et al. (2006)      
Yao et al. (2015)      
Touati et al. (2014)      
Borgh et al. (2017)      
Ambrosin et al. (2016)      
Wang et al. (2014)      
Ishiguro et al. (2013)      
Green et al. (2011)      
Balamurugan et al. (2013)      
Lai et al. (2013)      
Oualha & Nguyen (2016)      
Qin et al. (2015)      
Zhou & Huang (2012)      
Jin et al. (2015)      
real IoT environment or middlewares, but these works does not incorporates experimentation
with number of devices, the frequency of data generated by the sensors, devices and etc., and
also the type of data are not being considered.
CHAPTER 3
ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION FOR SMART HOME
Smart home is one of the IoT applications that is utilizing the full advantage of the Cloud
services. Since sensors, actuators and smart devices are resource-constrained and also they
are designed for longevity, so outsourcing data to the Cloud for storage, analytics, processing
and sharing is the best solution. One of the common privacy issue is being encountered when
untrusted third party cloud services and parties are accessing the sensitive data and using these
PII beyond their collection purpose. One privacy preserving approach addressing this speciﬁc
problem is to encrypt data at the source, before the data is sent to the cloud, according to
smart home owner preferences. So, incorporating security and privacy in IoT devices is the
most challenging due to the nature of these devices. Traditional access control mechanism
like XACML and SAML will totally block the data and for and encryption mechanism like
symmetric cryptography will generate multiple number of keys for data encryption. So we are
proposing to use ABE schemes as our solution model. In this chapter we will be illustrating
data security, privacy and access control using ABE cryptography integrated with a popular
open-source middleware openHAB.
3.1 Assumptions and Conﬁgurations
We are assuming that the data coming from the sensors to the middleware are protected using
symmetric cryptography and Transport Layer Security (TCP/IP with TLS and 128 bit AES
preshared key). The service providers and the users keys are generated by the owner, which
is transferred to the them through secured channel. For the cryptographic parameters we have
used supersingular elliptical curve with 512 bit security (SS512) and Miyaji, Nakabayashi and
Takano (MNT) curve (Miyaji et al. (2000)) with 224 bit security (MNT224).
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3.2 Architecture
Figure 3.1 shows an architecture overview of the proposed solution that integrates ABE with
openHAB. The system is divided into several modules:
Figure 3.1 Architecture Overview.
OpenHAB is the middleware responsible for data collection from the sensors, providing in-
terface for the home owner to communicate with the PM. It also provides the interface for the
decryption module (DM) for the service providers to view the data.
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Encryption Module (EM) is responsible for the generation generation of Public Key (PK)
and Master Secret Key (MSK) which is required for encryption and KG module. EM is also
responsible for the data encryption. The ﬂow chart of the EM is shown in the Figure 3.2.
Start
Generate the PK 
and MK
Wait for data 
from 
openHAB
openHAB Send Data
Attribute list
Encrypt(Data,attribu
te,MK)
Attribute list Key Generation
Send Attribute
Get the 
Attribute for 
sensor
Send Sensor ID
Figure 3.2 Encryption Module Flow Chart.
KeyGen Module (KG) is responsible for generating the user secret keys (SK) using the MSK
which is generated from the EM and the privacy settings deﬁned by the Home owner. The ﬂow
chart of the KG is shown in the Figure 3.3.
38
PK and MK from 
Encryption 
Module
Start
Add New User
Get the attributes
KeyGeneration(PK,MK,
Access Policy)
User Secret Key
End
Admin assign 
policy for userAdmin inputs the 
policy
Attributes
Figure 3.3 Key Generation Flow Chart.
Privacy Module (PM) provides the list of attributes required for deﬁning the policy which is
required by the EM and KG which is only accessible by the home owner.
Decryption Module (DM) is used by the service provider for decrypting the data using the
unique SK. The ﬂow chart of the DM is shown in the Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4 Decryption Flow Chart.
3.3 Implementation
In order to implement the privacy preserving architecture, we have used BeagleBone Black as
the hardware hosting the middleware and the privacy solution as it has the lowest hardware
conﬁguration. The hardware and the software speciﬁcation are illustrated in Table 3.1. To
conduct our experiments, we adopted three ABE schemes: KP-ABE, CP-ABE and an enhanced
version of KP-ABE (YCT) (Yao et al. (2015)). The details of the YCT scheme is shown in the
Appendix I.
Table 3.1 Hardware and Software Speciﬁcation
Processor M335X 1GHz ARM Cortex-A8
RAM 512MB DDR3
Storage 2GB eMMC ﬂash Storage
Operating System Ubuntu Minimal
Program OpenHAB
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The EM and KG modules are implemented using python while PM is implemented using
JavaScript. Using the openHAB’s rules scripting, we deﬁned the pipe-lining that allows the
transfer of the sensor data collected to the EM module. We are ensuring the conﬁdentiality of
data throughout the system by using cross application data transfer. Then the data is encrypted
before it is uploaded to the cloud. To deﬁne the privacy settings, we have used a form which
serves as a user interface for the PM module, which interacts with the home owner (admin)
allowing him to specify the access policies and attributes. In addition, the PM module interacts
with openHAB to get the list of sensors, their types and their organization inside the smart
home. Using the PM interface, the home owner can set up the parameters required for the
EM and KG. Furthermore, the admin is responsible for adding users and third-party services,
as well as assigning attributes to sensors. The KG module is responsible for generating cryp-
tographic keys and transmitting them to the users and service providers. The generated keys
satisfy the policies deﬁned by the home owner and are updated periodically depending on the
owner requirements. The service provider can get the data from the cloud and decrypt them
using the decryption module running in their system, provided they have the required keys.
3.4 Test Scenario
In our test scenario, we have used three services requiring access to the different sensors avail-
able in the smart home (Figure 3.5). Service S1 and Service S2 are managed by two different
residents of the house while Service S3 is managed by a utility company. As shown in Figure
3.5, we are simulating a house consisting of a living room, two bedrooms, a kitchen, a bath-
room, and a utility room. The types of data generated by the various sensors are presented in
Table 3.2.
Figure 3.6 shows the GUI provided by the PM module to set up the access policies. Here,
we have shown the settings when the KP-ABE scheme is applied. The GUI allows assigning
attributes to sensors and specifying policies overs attributes for services. The PM module
provides also a dual GUI for the CP-ABE settings where policies are speciﬁed for sensors and
attribute sets are assigned to services. The attributes set used for in our case is: A1, A2, A3,
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Light Sensor
Door Contact Sensor
Temperature Sensor
Gas/Fire Sensor
Water Flow Sensor
Gas Flow Sensor
Electricity consumption Sensor
Toilet Bedroom 1 Bedroom 2
Kitchen
Living Room
Utilities
Figure 3.5 Test Schematics and Sensors Locations.
Table 3.2 Sensor Details and Locations
Sensor Type Locations Data Type
Light
Bedroom 1, Bedroom 2, living
room, toilet, kitchen
String [dim, bright,
very bright]
Temperature
Bedroom 1, Bedroom 2, living
room, toilet, kitchen Float [2 decimal places]
Contact [Door]
Bedroom 1, Bedroom 2, living
room, toilet, kitchen Binary [Open/Close]
Gas Dectection Kitchen
String [low, medium,
heavy]
Water Flow Utility room Integer
Electricity
Consumption Utility room Integer
Gas Flow Utility room Integer
A4, A5, A6. An example of possible KP-ABE settings is presented in Table 3.3 (assigning
attributes to sensors) and Table 3.4 (policies speciﬁcation for the involved services).
The services use a web interface to get the data for all the sensors but they can only view the
sensed data for which they have access right. For those sensed data for which a service does
not have the right to access, the message ‘denied’ is displayed. From Figure 3.7 , we can see
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Table 3.3 Services Access and policy
Service Sensors Access Access Policy
S1 Bedroom 1, living room, A1 or A2
bathroom, kitchen
S2 Living Room, Bedroom 2, A3 or A4
Bathroom
S3 Utility room A5 or A6
Table 3.4 Attribute set for sensors
Sensor Location Attribute set
Living room A1,A2,A3,A4
Bedroom 1 A1,A2
Bedroom 2 A3,A4
Kitchen A1,A2
Bathroom A1,A2,A3,A4
Utility room A5,A6
that Service S1 is denied from accessing the data collected from Bedroom 2 and Utility room.
For the sake of demonstration, we added two other services.
- The ‘Smart House’ service granted access to all the sensors (holding all the required de-
cryption keys). As shown in the ﬁrst column of Figure 3.7, all the sensed data values are
displayed in plaintext (successfully decrypted by the service).
- The ‘Encrypted’ service being denied access to all the sensors (having no valid decryption
key). As shown in the second column of Figure 3.7, all the sensed data is displayed as
ciphertext (unintelligible because the service failed to decrypt them).
3.5 Evaluation
In order to evaluate our implementation, we have measured the encryption overhead of three
different ABE schemes: the CP-ABE and the KP-ABE implementations provided by (Charm)
and an enhanced implementation of KP-ABE (Yao et al. (2015)). We have used all the nineteen
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Figure 3.6 Assignment of Attribute Sets and Privacy Setting.
sensors presented in the test scenario. Each sensor sends periodically a new data value every
twenty seconds. In addition, we have varied the number of used attributes or policy from ﬁve
to thirty. We have measured the overall execution time required to encrypt the data received
by the EM module from openHAB (Figure 3.8). More detailed results are presented in Figure
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Figure 3.7 Screen Shot of Different Users.
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Figure 3.8 Time Overhead of ABE
Encryption Schemes.
3.9a to Figure 3.11c, they depict the resources utilization and the latency of the overall process,
in term of data frequency, number of sensors and keeping the attribute or policy ﬁxed at thirty.
As shown in the experimental results, resources consumption and system latency increases
gradually when the number of connected sensors and the frequency of the data are increased.
However, more valuable conclusions can be extracted from careful investigation of the results
shown by each ﬁgure. Let us start with the results related to CPU consumption. Depending on
the maximum CPU% that can be granted to the system, some conﬁgurations become infeasible.
For example, if the maximum CPU percentage is 50%, then the system equipped by CP-ABE
cannot serve more than 5 sensors and the interval of collecting data for this maximum should
be strictly greater than 5 seconds (Figure 3.9a). For the same CPU maximum percentage,
KP-ABE is providing better capabilities (Figure 3.10a) being able to serve a maximum of 10
sensors provided that the interval of collecting data is greater than 10 seconds. For the third
ABE algorithm (Figure 3.11a), a maximum of 15 sensors can be served if data is collected each
20 seconds. Based on the results related to memory overhead, almost all the conﬁgurations of
the three algorithms are feasible when a maximum of 50% memory budget is available.
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Figure 3.9 CP-ABE results.
More precise conclusion can be extracted from the results provided by Figure 3.9b, Figure
3.10b and Figure 3.11b when less memory budget is dedicated to the system. The results
related to latency are of paramount importance especially for environments where the most up
to date data is required. In fact, if the remote services should be aware of any update within a
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Figure 3.10 KP-ABE results.
maximum of 5 seconds, then CP-ABE should be discarded. More precise conclusions can be
extracted for other latency constraints.
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Figure 3.11 YCT results.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed an architecture and incorporated ABE cryptographic schemes
with openHAB, an well-known IoT smart home middleware. Then we have simulated a smart-
home with multiple sensors, users with different access control and showed that our proposed
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architecture is feasible with the middleware. Later we performed experimentations to show that
the architecture is capable of using the different ABE schemes and illustrated the performance
of the schemes in our architecture using resource utilization and latency of the system. From
the experimental results, we saw that performance of CP-ABE is higher than other schemes and
it is feasible enough to incorporate ABE in an smart home environment under certain condition
based on number and frequency of the sensors.

CHAPTER 4
OUTSOURCING ENCRYPTION IN A SMART HOME
ABE is one of the most prominent way to achieve dynamic conﬁdentiality, privacy and access
control along with data encryption and integrity. The main drawback of ABE is that it requires
more resources than other asymmetric encryption schemes as shown from the experimentation
shown in the Chapter 3. Also since the IoT devices are built in way to achieve longevity and
they are used mostly to serve a speciﬁc purpose, so they are designed to have less resources
compared to the IoT edge devices as well as the cloud. So, in order to reduce the computational
overheads we propose a framework that does partial encryption at the gateway and outsource
most of the heavy computation to the cloud. However, we cannot trust the proxy server always,
so we have used a solution that uses the concept of partial encryption at the gateway and rest
of the computational processing at a proxy server running in the cloud.
4.1 Dummy Attribute ABE scheme
In this chapter, we are using the ABE ofﬂoading technique that is proposed by (Jin et al.
(2015)). The scheme uses the concept of dummy attribute and uses a speciﬁc access tree as
shown in Figure 4.1. The algorithms for this scheme are as follows:
Setup → (MK, MSK): The algorithm generates the PK and MSK which is required by the
encryption and key generation algorithms.
KeyGen (PK, MSK, ω)→ SK: KeyGen (Key Generation) take the PK, MSK, and ω as input.
ω is list of attribute of the user. The output of this algorithm is the secret key SK.
EncryptionDummy (Message, α)→ CTDummy: At this algorithm the user encrypts his/her data
with α where α is the access policy. The algorithm calculates the shares of the of the access
tree and encrypts the message with the dummy attribute of the access tree. The output of this
algorithm is the CTDummy.
52
AND
OR
AND
Attribute A
Attribute C
Attribute B
Dummy
Figure 4.1 Dummy Access Tree.
EncryptionActual (CTDummy, PK)→ CTActual: At this stage the algorithm uses CTDummy and
calculates the complicated exponential polynomial calculations on each shares and generates
the actual ciphertext CTActual which includes the CTDummy.
Decryption (SK, CTActual)→ Message: This algorithm is used by the clients who use their
secret key to recover the message.
4.2 Architecture
Figure 4.2 shows our architecture on smart home ecosystem. The architecture divides into ﬁve
modules as the following:
Data Collector Module (DCM) is used for receiving data from the sensors. DCM acts as a
middleware in the smart home gateway. The module run threads for accepting connection from
the sensors, then it veriﬁes and authenticate the sensors’ information and prepares the data into
a speciﬁc format then forwards to Gateway Encryption module of the home gateway.
Gateway Encryption Module (GEM) is responsible for encrypting the data coming from
the DCM. When a data receives from the DCM it checks the database and ﬁnds the policy
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Figure 4.2 Outsourcing Architecture Overview.
corresponding to that sensor including the dummy attribute. Then the module encrypts it with
the dummy attribute, calculates the shares and sends it to the Remote Encryption Module.
Proxy Encryption Module (PEM) is responsible for encrypting the data from GEM using the
actual policy/attributes which is set by the owner. PEM checks the message for the shares and
uses that shares to perform the polynomial computation to prepare the ﬁnal CT of data and
sends to the cloud for storage.
KeyGen Module (KM) is responsible for generating the PK and MK which are required by
the GEM for encrypting the data and SKs for the services for decrypting. During generating
the SK the KM incorporates the dummy attributes as well.
Privacy Module (PM) interacts with the admin for setting up the primitives required by the
GEM and KM which is the incorporating a unique dummy attribute to each policy and the
attribute set of the users and as well as policy for the data encryption.
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Decryption Module (DM) decrypts the CT using the SK. If the secret key satisﬁes the access
policy then the data is displayed else "Denied" is diplayed.
4.3 Implementation
The implementation of the modules are implemented using python and also we are using charm
(Akinyele et al. (2013)) (Charm) for their crypto modules. The data from the sensors are
converted to bytes before it is feed into the GEM. We also used the serialize and de-serialize
functions of charm for the conversion of cipher text into byte codes, so that the parameters
and the message become unreadable even more. In order to evaluate the performance of our
framework we are using a custom data collector (DCM) which serves as a middleware. Our
framework can used as plug and play with any other smart-home middlewares. In order to keep
the environment simple, we are using TCP for data communication. We will be simulating
a smart home with different types of sensors places in different locations of a house. All the
sensors will send data to the gateway, which is in our case, is Raspberry Pi which will act as the
DCM and GEM, and a desktop PC which will act as PEM. The conﬁgurations of the gateway
and desktop is displayed in table 4.1 and 4.2. Table 4.3 shows the type of data generated by the
sensors and their identiﬁcation.
Table 4.1 Hardware and Software Speciﬁcation of
Gateway
Processor 1.2GHz 64 bit quad-core ARMv8
RAM 1GB
Storage 16GB eMMC ﬂash Storage
Operating System Raspberian Debian OS
4.4 Test Scenario
We will be evaluating our architecture with different types of ABE using the same scenario
illustrated in Figure 3.5. We are using one dummy attribute for GEM which is unique attribute
assigned to each sensors and based on access we will assign those dummy attributes for the key
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Table 4.2 Hardware and Software
Speciﬁcation of Proxy
Processor Intel i7 3.2 GHz Quad Core
RAM 16GB RAM
Storage 320GB
Operating System Ubuntu
generation. In addition, we will have three services which will have access to the sensor data
based on the ABE policy. The conﬁguration for CP-ABE is shown in table 4.5 and in table 4.4
is for KP-ABE.
Table 4.3 Sensor Information and data type
Sensor type Sensor ID Data type
Light Light1....Light8 String [Dim, Bright, Very Bright]
Temperature Temp1....Temp7 Float [2 decimal places]
Contact [Door] Cont1....Cont8 String [Open/close]
Smoke Detection Smoke1....Smoke4 String [low, medium, heavy]
Water Flow Water Integer
Electricity consumption Elec Integer
Gas Flow Gas Integer
Table 4.4 KP-ABE settings
Sensor ID Dummy Attribute Actual Attribute
Light1 D1 Attribute1 .... Attribute4
Temp1 D9 Attribute5 .... Attribute8
Cont1 D16 Attribute9 .... Attribute12
Smoke1 D24 Attribute13 .... Attribute16
Water D28 Attribute17 .... Attribute20
Elec D29 Attribute21 .... Attribute24
Gas D30 Attribute25 .... Attribute28
Home admin or the owner is responsible for setting up the attributes and policies required for
the KM and PEM by using the PM. PM is a graphical user interface as shown in Figure 4.3 for
KP-ABE setup where the home admin can select the attributes for the sensors and write policies
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Table 4.5 CP-ABE settings
Sensor ID Dummy Policy Actual Policy
Light1 D1 Attribute1 AND Attribute2 AND ... Attribute4
Temp1 D9 Attribute5 AND Attribute6 AND ... Attribute8
Cont1 D16 Attribute9 AND Attribute10 AND ... Attribute12
Smoke1 D24 Attribute13 AND Attribute14 AND ... Attribute16
Water D28 Attribute17 AND Attribute18 AND ... Attribute20
Elec D29 Attribute21 AND Attribute22 AND ... Attribute24
Gas D30 Attribute25 AND Attribute26 AND ... Attribute28
Figure 4.3 Policy Module.
for the services for generating the secret key. For CP-ABE the interface is reversed; attributes
for services and policy for the sensors. KG is responsible for setting up the environment by
generating the PK and MK, and then transferring them to the GEM. KM is also responsible for
generating the secret keys of the services and transmitting to the designated service in a secured
manner. DCM acts a smart home middleware and collects data from the sensors and forwarding
to the GEM using inter processing communication. GEM is responsible for encrypting the data
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Figure 4.4 Screen shot of data collector and
different service.
using one dummy attribute and then the data is being transferred to the PEM. PEM does the
encryption with actual attributes/policy which is set by the home admin and then the encrypted
data is stored in the cloud. The services can only decrypt the data from the cloud if they have the
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decryption module running in their system and has a valid key, which satisﬁes the requirement
of ABE. Figure 4.4 shows the view of different modules and services. From the left of Figure
4.4 is the visual representation of DCM and the rest are different services who have access to
different sensors. If the service have access to that sensor they can view the value else denied
message is shown based on the access policy of the services.
4.5 Evaluation
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Figure 4.5 Experimentation on different techniques and settings.
In order to evaluate our framework, we will be performing experimentation based on the CPU,
Memory, Power consumption and Latency of the KP-ABE, CP-ABE and a revised version of
KP-ABE. In the experimentation we will be using length of 30 attributes/policy, 30 sensors and
sample of 150 data at maximum for the ABE settings. We test different KP-ABE and CP-ABE
schemes on our architecture to check which scheme are more suitable in smart home scenario.
In our experimentation we are using a python script to determine the resource utilization, to
calculate the latency we measure the difference between the time when the data enters the
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a) Ciphertext Size.
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Figure 4.6 Initial results.
DC and when the encryption is fully completed. Also an USB tester to calculate the power
consumption of the Raspberry Pi.
In Figure 4.5a shows the performance of the resource utilization (CPU, Memory and Latency)
of gateway of CP-ABE using ofﬂoading the encryption. In this experimentation, we performed
the encryption at a local gateway (Raspberry pi), part of encryption at gateway and part at
proxy, and then all the encryption at the proxy server. Figure 4.5b explains the frequency
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Figure 4.7 Encryption Overhead.
of data coming to the middleware based on the number of sensors and their rate of sending
data. In this experimentation, we used 30 sensors and varying the sending rate of data from
20 seconds to 5 seconds. Figure 4.6a shows the size of cipher text using a constant message
of 10 character with varying the attributes/policy. Figure 4.6b displays the secret key size with
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Figure 4.8 CPU Utilization.
different attributes/policy. Figure 4.6c shows the key generation varying the attributes from
1 to 500 at the gateway. Figure 4.7b and 4.7a displays the execution time of full encryption
and ofﬂoaded encryption. Figure 4.8a, 4.8b, 4.9a and 4.9b shows the resource utilization for
data interval 2 seconds to 0.05 seconds when sensors are introduced in the system for full and
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a) Full Encryption Memory Utilization.
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Figure 4.9 Memory Utilization.
ofﬂoaded encryption. Figure 4.10a and 4.10b displays the power utilization of the gateway
with the interval of data. Figure 4.11a and 4.11b shows the latency of our system with respect
with the data interval.
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Figure 4.10 Power Consumption.
From the results of Figure 4.5b, we see that the interval of data coming increases from 2 sec-
onds to 0.5 seconds when the frequency increased from 20 seconds to 5 seconds. In Figure 4.5a
we can see that if the system performs all the computation at the remote server, the resource
utilization and latency decreased by 40%. From the Figure 4.6c shows with the higher number
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Figure 4.11 Latency.
of policy/ attributes the execution time of Secret Key Generation increases. From Figure 4.6b
and 4.6a we can determine that with the increase of attribute/ policy the size of the message
also increases and CP-ABE has the highest in size compared to YCT and KP-ABE. If we per-
form all encryption at the Gateway (see Figure 4.7a the execution time increases gradually for
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the number of attribute where as if we do partial encryption at the gateway and ofﬂoad the rest
to the proxy (see Figure 4.7b)the execution time is decreased ten times the execution at the
gateway and from these two ﬁgures, we can evaluate that the encryption have a very big impact
where the execution is taking place. From the Figure 4.8a and 4.8b, we can see that the cpu
utilization of CP-ABE 20% higher than other ABE schemes at data interval 2 to 0.5 and then
gradually increases in the GEM for both cases. Also we can notice that the CPU consumption
is lower when we do partial encryption rather than full encryption. In Figure 4.9b and 4.9a
the memory utilization is almost similar for all the schemes and they are below 40% of the
total memory available. From Figure 4.10b and 4.10a we can say that the power consumption
does not go above 2.7 watt when the data interval is at 0.05 seconds. Further evaluation can be
drawn from Figure 4.11a and 4.11b which shows the latency of a data which it requires for the
whole process. We can see that the CP-ABE has the highest latency among the schemes and
YCT has the lowest for both cases. If the system have a threshold of 10 second latency then:
- For full encryption minimum data interval for:
• CP-ABE is 1 second;
• KP-ABE is 0.7 second;
• YCT-ABE is 0.5 second.
- For partial encryption minimum data interval for:
• CP-ABE is 0.7 second;
• KP-ABE is 0.7 second;
• YCT-ABE is 0.3 second.
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In conclusion, doing partial encryption at the gateway and ofﬂoading the rest to the proxy
reduces the resource consumption and mainly latency of the data by 30% than doing full en-
cryption process in the gateway.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have shown how we can ofﬂoad the encryption process to a proxy server
even though the proxy is not trusted for computation, where we partially encrypt the data at the
gateway and rest of the computation is being ofﬂoaded to the proxy server. We have presented
the architecture and we have simulated a smart environment that our proposed architecture
is feasible. Later we have experimented with different ABE schemes based on the resource
consumption and latency based on interval that the gateway is receiving data.
CHAPTER 5
FUTURE WORK
During the last few years, the computation ofﬂoading from resource constrained devices are be-
coming popular. (Khan (2015)) did a comprehensive survey of the differnt ofﬂoading strategies
to improve the performance of the mobile applications. (Tout et al. (2017)) proposed an intelli-
gent model for computation ofﬂoading of mobile devices using a central decision engine which
decides whether the data will be processed at the device or it should be ofﬂoaded to the cloud
based on the resources available. (Tripathi (2017)) surveyed the issues regarding the ofﬂoad-
ing techniques and also provided some solutions using adaptive computation ofﬂoading for the
MCC. (Cao & Cai (2018)) proposed a multi-user fully distributed computation ofﬂoading to
Cloudlets using a theoristic machine learning approach. (Sharma et al. (2017)) (Kovachev et al.
(2012)) (Chen et al. (2016)) (Kemp et al. (2010)) proposed different ofﬂoading techniques for
adaptive computational ofﬂoading of MCC. (Shukla & Munir (2016)) proposed a computation
ofﬂoading scheme where the IoT devices requests resourceful devices to perform the compu-
tation of its behalf. (Mazza et al. (2016)) used a cluster based computation offoading to reduce
the energy consumption and execution of smart mobile devices in smart cities. (Samie et al.
(2016)) (Wang et al. (2017)) (Kattepur et al. (2016)) also showed different ways to ofﬂoad
computation from resource constrained devices to the cloud.
As shown in the dissertation, that one of the best way to achieve access control, security and
integrity requirement according to the new regulations and users’ privacy is to use Attribute-
Based Encryption (ABE) which provides access control as well as data encryption. But ABE
requires more resources than other symmetric or asymmetric encryption schemes. There are
lot of implementation of ABE to cope with the resource constrained devices but the latency
of those implementations are still too high and also in most cases, the IoT devices in an smart
environment remains idle during most of the time. So we are proposing a way of using load-
balancing the encryption using idle devices in a smart-home as well IoT edge devices before
the data is stored in the cloud as our future work which is shown in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1 Load Balancing Architecture.
Data Collector is the interface where the sensors in the smart home communicate with each
other. Decision Module decides what type of encryption and where the encryption will be
done. Privacy Module interface for setting the policy and access control of the home owner
and service provider. Encryption Module will do the encryption based on policy of the sen-
sor. KeyGen Module is responsible for generating the keys for the encryptions and the service
provider. Computation handler will perform partial encryption and package for the full com-
putation of the encryption for the computation module. Computation Module is responsible
of computation of the partially encrypted data into a complete cipher text.
The decision module will decide the best selection for encryption based on the length of the
policy, data type and available resources available to have the lowest latency with least resource
consumption along with the highest privacy level. Classiﬁcation of choice is shown in the
Figure 5.2.
Based on the input, it will either choose full encryption at the gateway or other idle devices
in the smart-home or it will choose partial encryption on the idle local devices or the proxy
servers. The decision module will be have the priority of doing full encryption at the high-
69
DATA
1
3
m
Data Size
1
3
n
Policy 
Length
Low
Data 
Sensitivity
Medium
High
Low
Data 
Priority
Medium
High
1
Network 
Latency
5
o
Trusted
Device 
Trust
Partially
Encryption
Full
Partial
1
3
p
Device
Figure 5.2 Classiﬁcation rule.
est level or partial at the medium level based on the settings of sensors’ data priority. As the
resource, execution time and latency depends on the number of policy, frequency of data and
the hardware speciﬁcation of the devices as well as the trust of the device will effect the de-
cision of the algorithm. The objective of the approach is to minimize resource consumption
and execution time of the encryption process as well as to decrease the latency of the overall
process.
In summary, in this chapter we have shown how we can extend the research to utilize the idle
devices in an smart environment by using Machine Learning approach for the encryption. We
have also presented a preliminary architectural model, classiﬁcation overview and classiﬁcation
rules for the encryption load balancing technique.

CONCLUSION
The main focus of the dissertation was to propose an architectural framework for incorporating
data encryption along with access control to an IoT environment. Security and privacy of IoT
is one of the most challenging and complicated aspects in the IoT domain due to the nature
of these ubiquitous resource constrained devices. In our research we have shown that it is
feasible for the IoT devices to have the capabilities to integrates security components with the
middleware for securing the PII data of the users along with access control, encryption and
integrity. In order to achieve the goal of the research we have used ABE as our cryptographic
solution and also extended the architecture to reduce the overhead computation in the IoT
middleware.
An overview of the security and privacy concerns of IoT are presented in Introduction where we
highlighted the need for security of data, based on different aspects like the cloud, the data in
transit, the trend of the IoT and including some vulnerabilities concerning the IoT technologies.
We have shown the necessity of protecting the PII data based on the regulations and standards
imposed by the governing bodies. The current trend of the IoT is not offering adequate security
mechanism that deals with the data privacy, data encryption and access control.
In Chapter 1, we presented the details of the cryptographic primitives for the asymmetric cryp-
tography that we have used in this dissertation including the PBC, ECC and ABE. In this
chapter we have also presented a detailed background studies required for the IoT middlewares
along with some of the well-known examples of IoT middlwares along with their comparison.
In Chapter 2, we have illustrated the related works that have accomplished in the ﬁeld of IoT
security and privacy along with the ABE schemes and types and different variations of the
schemes.
The proposed security architectural framework that is incorporated with the openHAB mid-
dleware was presented in Chapter 3. We have used a smart home environment to test and
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implement the security architecture using ABE. Later we experimented our architecture with
different ABE schemes to see the overhead of the implementations with respect to the resource
consumptions like CPU and memory usage and as well the latency of the system based on
the frequency of the data generated by the sensors in the smart home environment. From the
experimental results, we ﬁgured that the overall overhead and latency is partially suitable for
the IoT environment.
Then we extend the our privacy preserving architecture in Chapter 4 to outsource the encryp-
tion process to reduce the overhead in the smart home gateway. In this extended architecture,
we proposed an ABE technique where the gateway performs partial encryption and the rest of
the encryption computation was transferred to a proxy server. The main idea of this approach
is to do a encryption with one attribute at the gateway and the rest of the computation is done
at the proxy server. We have provided in details how the architecture works as well the exper-
imentation and experimental setup for the evaluating the implementation with different ABE
schemes. From the implementation and results, we have shown that we are capable of reducing
30% of the resource consumption on the smart gateway.
In Chapter 5, we have showed how it is possible to extend the our implementation for future
directions using Machine Learning techniques and neural network model. In this chapter we
have designed an architecture where every devices in the smart environment will act as encryp-
tion modules to reduce the overhead and ultimately the latency of the data from the source to
the destination.
In our research we have shown that it is feasible to incorporate ABE in an smart home en-
vironment. Also we observed that CP-ABE is more dynamic in terms of access control but
it requires more resources than other scheme. Whereas YCT has better performance since it
does pre-computation during the initialization stage but it does not allow adding new attributes
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dynamically. The decision for the ABE scheme for the smart home will be dependant on the
parameters of the ABE like the attribute list and policy the length.

APPENDIX I
ATTRIBUTE BASED ENCRYPTION ALGORITHMS
1. CP-ABE
1.1 Setup
g , gp = group . random (G1 ) , group . random (G2)
a lpha , b e t a = group . random (ZR) , group . random (ZR)
g . i n i t P P ( ) ; gp . i n i t P P ( )
h = g ∗∗ b e t a ; f = g ∗∗ ~ b e t a
e_gg_a lpha = p a i r ( g , gp ∗∗ a l ph a )
pk = { ’g ’ : g , ’ g2 ’ : gp , ’h ’ : h , ’ f ’ : f ,
’ e_gg_a lpha ’ : e_gg_a lpha }
mk = { ’ be t a ’ : be t a , ’ g2_a lpha ’ : gp ∗∗ a l ph a }
r e t u r n ( pk ,mk)
1.2 Key Generation
r = group . random ( )
g_r = ( pk [ ’ g2 ’ ] ∗∗ r )
D = (mk[ ’ g2_a lpha ’ ] ∗ g_r ) ∗∗ (1 / mk[ ’ be t a ’ ] )
D_j , D_j_pr = {} , {}
f o r j i n S :
r _ j = group . random ( )
D_j [ j ] = g_r ∗ ( group . hash ( j , G2 ) ∗∗ r _ j )
D_j_pr [ j ] = pk [ ’ g ’ ] ∗∗ r _ j
r e t u r n { ’D’ :D, ’Dj ’ : D_j , ’Djp ’ : D_j_pr , ’S ’ : S }
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1.3 Encryption
p o l i c y = u t i l . c r e a t e P o l i c y ( p o l i c y _ s t r )
a _ l i s t = u t i l . g e t A t t r i b u t e L i s t ( p o l i c y )
s = group . random (ZR)
s h a r e s = u t i l . c a l c u l a t e S h a r e s D i c t ( s , p o l i c y )
C = pk [ ’ h ’ ] ∗∗ s
C_y , C_y_pr = {} , {}
f o r i i n s h a r e s . keys ( ) :
j = u t i l . s t r i p _ i n d e x ( i )
C_y [ i ] = pk [ ’ g ’ ] ∗∗ s h a r e s [ i ]
C_y_pr [ i ] = group . hash ( j , G2 ) ∗∗ s h a r e s [ i ]
r e t u r n { ’ C_ t i l d e ’ : ( pk [ ’ e_gg_a lpha ’ ] ∗∗ s ) ∗ M,
’C ’ : C , ’Cy ’ : C_y , ’Cyp ’ : C_y_pr , ’ po l i c y ’ : p o l i c y _ s t r ,
’ a t t r i b u t e s ’ : a _ l i s t }
1.4 Decryption
p o l i c y = u t i l . c r e a t e P o l i c y ( c t [ ’ p o l i c y ’ ] )
p r u n e d _ l i s t = u t i l . p rune ( po l i c y , sk [ ’ S ’ ] )
i f p r u n e d _ l i s t == F a l s e :
r e t u r n F a l s e
z = u t i l . g e t C o e f f i c i e n t s ( p o l i c y )
A = 1
f o r i i n p r u n e d _ l i s t :
j = i . g e tA t t r i b u t eAnd I n d e x ( ) ; k = i . g e t A t t r i b u t e ( )
A ∗= ( p a i r ( c t [ ’Cy ’ ] [ j ] , sk [ ’ Dj ’ ] [ k ] ) / p a i r ( sk [ ’ Djp ’ ] [ k ] ,
c t [ ’ Cyp ’ ] [ j ] ) ) ∗∗ z [ j ]
r e t u r n c t [ ’ C_ t i l d e ’ ] / ( p a i r ( c t [ ’C ’ ] , sk [ ’D’ ] ) / A)
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2. KP-ABE
2.1 Setup
a lpha1 , a lpha2 , b = group . random (ZR) , group . random (ZR) ,
group . random (ZR)
a l ph a = a l pha1 ∗ a l pha2
g_G1 , g_G2 = group . random (G1 ) , group . random (G2) # PK 1 ,2
h_G1 , h_G2 = group . random (G1 ) , group . random (G2) # PK 3
g1b = g_G1 ∗∗ b
e_gg_a lpha = p a i r ( g_G1 , g_G2 ) ∗∗ a l ph a
pk = { ’g_G1 ’ : g_G1 , ’g_G2 ’ : g_G2 , ’ g_G1_b ’ : g1b ,
’ g_G1_b2 ’ : g1b ∗∗ b , ’ h_G1_b ’ : h_G1 ∗∗ b ,
’ e ( gg ) _a lpha ’ : e_gg_a lpha }
mk = { ’ a lpha1 ’ : a lpha1 , ’ a lpha2 ’ : a lpha2 , ’b ’ : b ,
’h_G1 ’ : h_G1 , ’h_G2 ’ : h_G2 }
r e t u r n ( pk , mk)
2.2 Key Generation
p o l i c y = u t i l . c r e a t e P o l i c y ( p o l i c y _ s t r )
a t t r _ l i s t = u t i l . g e t A t t r i b u t e L i s t ( p o l i c y )
s = mk[ ’ a lpha1 ’ ] ; s e c r e t = s
s h a r e s = u t i l . c a l c u l a t e S h a r e s D i c t ( s e c r e t , p o l i c y )
D = { ’ po l i c y ’ : p o l i c y _ s t r }
f o r x i n a t t r _ l i s t :
y = u t i l . s t r i p _ i n d e x ( x )
d = [ ] ; r = group . random (ZR)
i f no t s e l f . n e g a t e dA t t r ( x ) : # meaning p o s i t i v e
d . append ( ( pk [ ’ g_G1 ’ ] ∗∗ (mk[ ’ a lpha2 ’ ] ∗ s h a r e s [ x ] ) )
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∗ ( group . hash ( y , G1) ∗∗ r ) )
d . append ( ( pk [ ’ g_G2 ’ ] ∗∗ r ) )
D[ x ] = d
r e t u r n D
2.3 Encryption
t = group . i n i t (ZR , 0 )
s = group . random ( ) ; sx = [ s ]
f o r i i n r ange ( l e n ( a t t r _ l i s t ) ) :
sx . append ( group . random (ZR ) )
sx [ 0 ] −= sx [ i ]
E3 = {}
f o r i i n r ange ( l e n ( a t t r _ l i s t ) ) :
a t t r = a t t r _ l i s t [ i ]
E3 [ a t t r ] = group . hash ( a t t r , G1 ) ∗∗ s
E1 = ( pk [ ’ e ( gg ) _a lpha ’ ] ∗∗ s ) ∗ M
E2 = pk [ ’ g_G2 ’ ] ∗∗ s
r e t u r n { ’E1 ’ : E1 , ’E2 ’ : E2 , ’E3 ’ : E3 , ’ a t t r i b u t e s ’ : a t t r _ l i s t }
2.4 Decryption
p o l i c y = u t i l . c r e a t e P o l i c y (D[ ’ po l i c y ’ ] )
a t t r s = u t i l . p rune ( po l i c y , E [ ’ a t t r i b u t e s ’ ] )
i f a t t r s == F a l s e :
r e t u r n F a l s e
c o e f f = u t i l . g e t C o e f f i c i e n t s ( p o l i c y )
Z = {} ; prodT = 1
f o r i i n r ange ( l e n ( a t t r s ) ) :
x = a t t r s [ i ] . g e t A t t r i b u t e ( )
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y = a t t r s [ i ] . g e tA t t r i b u t eAnd I n d e x ( )
i f no t s e l f . n e g a t e dA t t r ( y ) :
Z [ y ] = p a i r (D[ y ] [ 0 ] , E [ ’ E2 ’ ] )
/ p a i r (E [ ’ E3 ’ ] [ x ] , D[ y ] [ 1 ] )
prodT ∗= Z[ y ] ∗∗ c o e f f [ y ]
r e t u r n E[ ’ E1 ’ ] / prodT
3. YCT-ABE
3.1 Setup
s = group . random (ZR)
g = group . random (G1)
s e l f . a t t r i b u t e S e c r e t s = {}
s e l f . a t t r i b u t e = {}
f o r a t t r i n a t t r i b u t e s :
s i = group . random (ZR)
s e l f . a t t r i b u t e S e c r e t s [ a t t r ] = s i
s e l f . a t t r i b u t e [ a t t r ] = g∗∗ s i
r e t u r n ( g∗∗ s , s ) # ( pk , mk)
3.2 Key Generation
p o l i c y = u t i l . c r e a t e P o l i c y ( p o l i c y _ s t r )
a t t r _ l i s t = u t i l . g e t A t t r i b u t e L i s t ( p o l i c y )
s = mk
s h a r e s = u t i l . c a l c u l a t e S h a r e s D i c t ( s , p o l i c y )
D = { ’ po l i c y ’ : p o l i c y _ s t r , ’Du ’ : d }
f o r x i n a t t r _ l i s t :
y = u t i l . s t r i p _ i n d e x ( x )
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d [ y ] = s h a r e s [ x ] / s e l f . a t t r i b u t e S e c r e t s [ y ]
r e t u r n D
3.3 Encryption
k = group . random (ZR ) ;
Cs = pk ∗∗ k
Ci = {}
f o r a t t r i n a t t r _ l i s t :
Ci [ a t t r ] = s e l f . a t t r i b u t e [ a t t r ] ∗∗ k
symcryp t = Symme t r i cC r yp t oAb s t r a c t i o n ( e x t r a c t o r ( Cs ) )
C = symcryp t . e n c r y p t (M)
r e t u r n { ’C ’ : C , ’Ci ’ : Ci , ’ a t t r i b u t e s ’ : a t t r _ l i s t }
3.4 Decryption
p o l i c y = u t i l . c r e a t e P o l i c y (D[ ’ po l i c y ’ ] )
a t t r s = u t i l . p rune ( po l i c y , C[ ’ a t t r i b u t e s ’ ] )
i f a t t r s == F a l s e :
r e t u r n F a l s e
c o e f f = u t i l . g e t C o e f f i c i e n t s ( p o l i c y )
Z = {}
prodT = 1
f o r i i n r ange ( l e n ( a t t r s ) ) :
x = a t t r s [ i ] . g e t A t t r i b u t e ( )
y = a t t r s [ i ] . g e tA t t r i b u t eAnd I n d e x ( )
Z [ y ] = C[ ’ Ci ’ ] [ x ] ∗∗ D[ ’Du ’ ] [ x ]
prodT ∗= Z[ y ] ∗∗ c o e f f [ y ]
symcryp t = Symme t r i cC r yp t oAb s t r a c t i o n ( e x t r a c t o r ( prodT ) )
r e t u r n symcryp t . d e c r y p t (C[ ’C ’ ] )
APPENDIX II
OPENHAB CONFIGURATION
1. Sensor Conﬁguration Settings
S t r i n g LTemp " Tempera tu r e : [%s ] "
{ t c p =" < [∗ : 25002 : ’REGEX( ( . ∗ ) ) ’ ] " }
S t r i n g LLigh t " L i gh t : [%s ] "
{ t c p =" < [∗ : 25003 : ’REGEX( ( . ∗ ) ) ’ ] " }
S t r i n g KTemp " Tempera tu r e : [%s ] "
{ t c p =" < [∗ : 25004 : ’REGEX( ( . ∗ ) ) ’ ] " }
S t r i n g KLight " L i gh t : [%s ] "
{ t c p =" < [∗ : 25005 : ’REGEX( ( . ∗ ) ) ’ ] " }
S t r i n g KSTemp " S tove Tempera tu r e : [%s ] "
{ t c p =" < [∗ : 25006 : ’REGEX( ( . ∗ ) ) ’ ] " }
S t r i n g KCont " Cab i n e t 1 : [%s ] "
{ t c p =" < [∗ : 25007 : ’REGEX( ( . ∗ ) ) ’ ] " }
S t r i n g KGas "Smoke De t e c t o r : [%s ] "
{ t c p =" < [∗ : 25008 : ’REGEX( ( . ∗ ) ) ’ ] " }
2. Rules for sensor classiﬁcation
impo r t o rg . openhab . co r e . l i b r a r y . t y p e s .∗
va r S t r i n g Epath = " python3 / home / r c / Desktop / Resea r ch
/ charm−dev / charm / schemes / abenc /Demo / enc ry . py "
va r S t r i n g Dpath = " py thon3 / home / r c / Desktop / Resea r ch
/ charm−dev / charm / schemes / abenc /Demo / d i s p . py "
va r S t r i n g DEpath = " py thon3 / home / r c / Desktop / Resea r ch
/ charm−dev / charm / schemes / abenc /Demo / dec ry . py "
va r S t r i n g pa t h = " py thon3 / home / r c / Desktop / Resea r ch
82
/ charm−dev / charm / schemes / abenc /Demo / upda t e . py "
r u l e " d a t a f o r s e n s o r Ltemp "
when
I tem LTemp r e c e i v e d upda t e
t h en
va r s t a t e = LTemp . s t a t e
va r S t r i n g d a t a
va r S t r i n g r e cv
va r S t r i n g d e c r y p t
va r S t r i n g e n c r y p t = Epath + s t a t e +" LTemp"
executeCommandLine ( e n c r y p t )
r e cv = Dpath +"LTemp"
d a t a = executeCommandLine ( recv , 5 0 00 )
ELTemp . po s tUpda t e ( d a t a )
d e c r y p t = DEpath +" s1 LTemp"
d a t a = executeCommandLine ( de c r yp t , 5 0 00 )
U1LTemp . po s tUpda t e ( d a t a )
d e c r y p t = DEpath +" s2 LTemp"
d a t a = executeCommandLine ( de c r yp t , 5 0 00 )
U2LTemp . po s tUpda t e ( d a t a )
d e c r y p t = DEpath +" s3 LTemp"
d a t a = executeCommandLine ( de c r yp t , 5 0 00 )
U3LTemp . po s tUpda t e ( d a t a )
end
r u l e " d a t a f o r s e n s o r LLigh t "
when
I tem LLigh t r e c e i v e d upda t e
t h en
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va r s t a t e = LLigh t . s t a t e
va r S t r i n g d a t a
va r S t r i n g r e cv
va r S t r i n g d e c r y p t
va r S t r i n g e n c r y p t = Epath + s t a t e +" LLigh t "
executeCommandLine ( e n c r y p t )
r e cv = Dpath +" LLigh t "
d a t a = executeCommandLine ( recv , 5 0 00 )
ELLight . po s tUpda t e ( d a t a )
d e c r y p t = DEpath +" s1 LLigh t "
d a t a = executeCommandLine ( de c r yp t , 5 0 00 )
U1LLight . po s tUpda t e ( d a t a )
d e c r y p t = DEpath +" s2 LLigh t "
d a t a = executeCommandLine ( de c r yp t , 5 0 00 )
U2LLight . po s tUpda t e ( d a t a )
d e c r y p t = DEpath +" s3 LLigh t "
d a t a = executeCommandLine ( de c r yp t , 5 0 00 )
U3LLight . po s tUpda t e ( d a t a )
end
r u l e " d a t a f o r s e n s o r KTemp"
when
I tem KTemp r e c e i v e d upda t e
t h en
va r s t a t e = KTemp . s t a t e
va r S t r i n g d a t a
va r S t r i n g r e cv
va r S t r i n g d e c r y p t
va r S t r i n g e n c r y p t = Epath + s t a t e +" KTemp"
executeCommandLine ( e n c r y p t )
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r e cv = Dpath +"KTemp"
d a t a = executeCommandLine ( recv , 5 0 00 )
EKTemp . po s tUpda t e ( d a t a )
d e c r y p t = DEpath +" s1 KTemp"
d a t a = executeCommandLine ( de c r yp t , 5 0 00 )
U1KTemp . po s tUpda t e ( d a t a )
d e c r y p t = DEpath +" s2 KTemp"
d a t a = executeCommandLine ( de c r yp t , 5 0 00 )
U2KTemp . po s tUpda t e ( d a t a )
d e c r y p t = DEpath +" s3 KTemp"
d a t a = executeCommandLine ( de c r yp t , 5 0 00 )
U3KTemp . po s tUpda t e ( d a t a )
end
r u l e " d a t a f o r s e n s o r KLight "
when
I tem KLight r e c e i v e d upda t e
t h en
va r s t a t e = KLight . s t a t e
va r S t r i n g d a t a
va r S t r i n g r e cv
va r S t r i n g d e c r y p t
va r S t r i n g e n c r y p t = Epath + s t a t e +" KLight "
executeCommandLine ( e n c r y p t )
r e cv = Dpath +" KLight "
d a t a = executeCommandLine ( recv , 5 0 00 )
EKLight . po s tUpda t e ( d a t a )
d e c r y p t = DEpath +" s1 KLight "
d a t a = executeCommandLine ( de c r yp t , 5 0 00 )
U1KLight . po s tUpda t e ( d a t a )
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d e c r y p t = DEpath +" s2 KLight "
d a t a = executeCommandLine ( de c r yp t , 5 0 00 )
U2KLight . po s tUpda t e ( d a t a )
d e c r y p t = DEpath +" s3 KLight "
d a t a = executeCommandLine ( de c r yp t , 5 0 00 )
U3KLight . po s tUpda t e ( d a t a )
end
3. Admin Control Panel
s i t emap admin l a b e l = "CONTROL PANEL"{
Frame l a b e l =" L iv i ng Room Tempera tu r e "{
Swi tch i t em= LTempa1
Swi tch i t em= LTempa2
Swi tch i t em= LTempa3
Swi tch i t em= LTempa4
Swi tch i t em= LTempa5
Swi tch i t em= LTempa6
}
Frame l a b e l =" L iv i ng Room L igh t "{
Swi tch i t em= LLigh ta1
Swi tch i t em= LLigh ta2
Swi tch i t em= LLigh ta3
Swi tch i t em= LLigh ta4
Swi tch i t em= LLigh ta5
Swi tch i t em= LLigh ta6
}
Frame l a b e l =" K i t chen Tempera tu r e "{
Swi tch i t em= KTempa1
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Swi tch i t em= KTempa2
Swi tch i t em= KTempa3
Swi tch i t em= KTempa4
Swi tch i t em= KTempa5
Swi tch i t em= KTempa6
}
Frame l a b e l =" K i t chen L i gh t "{
Swi tch i t em= KLighta1
Swi tch i t em= KLighta2
Swi tch i t em= KLighta3
Swi tch i t em= KLighta4
Swi tch i t em= KLighta5
Swi tch i t em= KLighta6
}
}
Frame l a b e l =" Po l i c y "{
Webview u r l = " h t t p : / / l o c a l h o s t :8080
/ s t a t i c / form / form . h tml " h e i g h t = 10
}
}
4. Example of user diaplay
s i t emap d e f a u l t l a b e l =" S e r v i c e 1" {
Frame l a b e l = " L iv i ng Room"
{
Text i t em= U1LTemp i con =" t emp e r a t u r e "
Text i t em= U1LLight i c on =" l i g h t −on "
}
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Frame l a b e l = " K i t chen "{
Text i t em= U1KTemp i con =" t emp e r a t u r e "
Text i t em= U1KLight i c on =" l i g h t −on "
Text i t em= U1KSTemp i con =" t emp e r a t u r e "
Text i t em= U1KCont i c on =" c o n t a c t "
Text i t em= U1KGas i con =" smoke "
}
Frame l a b e l ="BedRoom 1"{
Text i t em= U1R1Temp i con =" t emp e r a t u r e "
Text i t em= U1R1Light i c on =" l i g h t −on "
Text i t em= U1R1Cont i c on =" c o n t a c t "
}
Frame l a b e l ="BedRoom 2"{
Text i t em= U1R2Temp i con =" t emp e r a t u r e "
Text i t em= U1R2Light i c on =" l i g h t −on "
Text i t em= U1R2Cont i c on =" c o n t a c t "
}
Frame l a b e l ="Bathroom "{
Text i t em= U1BTemp i con =" t emp e r a t u r e "
Text i t em= U1BLight i c on =" l i g h t −on "
Text i t em= U1BCont i c on =" c o n t a c t "
}
Frame l a b e l =" U t i l i t i e s "{
Text i t em= U1UElec i con =" ene rgy "
Text i t em= U1UWater i c on =" wa te r1 "
Text i t em= U1UGas i con =" gas "
}
}
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